Slicing Secondary Assets to Broadly or to Narrow Undermines Risk Management
Last week, we tackled what makes a good secondary asset definition - why slicing too broadly or narrowly undermines effective risk management. Now, the real work begins: how do you actually slice secondary assets so risk becomes manageable, not a free-for-all?
- Slice too broad? Risk gets vague, ownership is unclear, and controls lose relevance.
- Slice too narrow? Oversight becomes fragmented, governance slows down, and everything feels brittle.
So how do you scope secondary assets in a way that makes risk tractable?
Here are five dimensions that consistently help - with the logic behind them, and how they show up in practice:
- Business use - Groups assets by purpose and stakeholder alignment.
- Why: Business context drives risk tolerance and prioritization.
- Example: “Customer Onboarding” and “Customer Retention” systems may use shared components - but they serve different stakeholders with different goals.
- Primary assets involved - Focuses on consistent protection requirements.
- Why: Systems handling different classes of data/processes have different confidentiality, integrity, and availability needs.
- Example: A reporting service handling public metrics doesn’t belong in the same scope as a backend processing customer PII - even if they run side by side.
- Threat exposure - Distinguishes based on exposure to risk.
- Why: Different threats require different controls to manage risk.
- Example: A web shop requires a different control posture than a batch job that runs behind a firewall. (It’s tempting to “assume breach” and slap the same controls everywhere. But protecting an isolated batch job with DDoS defenses? That’s budget wasted.)
- Technology stack - Anchors how we define applicable controls.
- Why: Different technology may need different controls for protection.
- Example: VMs need host hardening—patches, firewalls, configs. Containers need image scanning and runtime isolation.
- Ownership - Aligns scope to decision-making authority.
- Why: Risk decisions only work when someone’s actually accountable.
- Example: Two similar workflows managed by different teams should be scoped separately - to reflect real governance boundaries.
The goal? Scope secondary assets so that:
- One team can make coherent risk decisions
- One threat model mostly applies
- One control set can be reasonably defined
Because we don’t manage isolated components - we manage the services the business relies on, and the risks they carry.
What’s your biggest challenge scoping secondary assets — ownership gaps, overlapping threats, inconsistent controls, or something else?
Posts in this series
- Slicing Secondary Assets to Broadly or to Narrow Undermines Risk Management
- If Everything Is a (Secondary) Asset, Nothing Is Manageable